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  3. American Economic Review
  4. March 2022
  5. Estimating Social Preferences and Gift Exchange at Work

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

Estimating Social Preferences and Gift Exchange at Work

  • Stefano DellaVigna
  • John A. List
  • Ulrike Malmendier
  • Gautam Rao
American Economic Review
vol. 112, no. 3, March 2022
(pp. 1038–74)
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Abstract

We design three field experiments to estimate how workers' social preferences toward their employer motivates their work effort. We vary the pay rates offered to workers, the return to the employer, and employer generosity demonstrated via unexpected gifts. Workers exert effort even without private incentives, but their effort is insensitive to the return to the employer. This is consistent with "warm glow" but not pure altruism. The gifts have no effect on productivity, but engender extra work. This difference is explained partly by the finding that extra work is much more responsive to incentives than is productivity.

Citation

DellaVigna, Stefano, John A. List, Ulrike Malmendier, and Gautam Rao. 2022. "Estimating Social Preferences and Gift Exchange at Work." American Economic Review, 112 (3): 1038–74. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190920

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C93 Field Experiments
  • J24 Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
  • J28 Safety; Job Satisfaction; Related Public Policy
  • J33 Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
  • M52 Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects