American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
The Real State: Inside the Congo's Traffic Police Agency
American Economic Review
vol. 114,
no. 12, December 2024
(pp. 3976–4014)
Abstract
This paper provides insight into a corruption scheme in Kinshasa's traffic police agency. First, various data collection branches show that the agency's revenue is five times that from fines and is derived from a coalition of traffic police officials, their managers, and judicial police officers scheming to extort drivers. Second, the analysis of an experiment suggests that the scheme subverts service. Third, the scheme appears to be a rational response to the context, but its logic is widespread. The findings suggest that coalitions of officials, while being socially costly, can yield large illicit revenue, nuancing the notion of state weakness.Citation
Sánchez de la Sierra, Raúl, Kristof Titeca, Haoyang (Stan) Xie, Aimable Amani Lameke, and Albert Jolino Malukisa. 2024. "The Real State: Inside the Congo's Traffic Police Agency." American Economic Review, 114 (12): 3976–4014. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220908Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D73 Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H76 State and Local Government: Other Expenditure Categories
- K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements