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  1. Home
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  3. American Economic Review
  4. May 2007
  5. On Quitting Rights in Mechanism Design

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

On Quitting Rights in Mechanism Design

  • Olivier Compte
  • Philippe Jehiel
American Economic Review
vol. 97, no. 2, May 2007
(pp. 137–141)
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Citation

Compte, Olivier, and Philippe Jehiel. 2007. "On Quitting Rights in Mechanism Design." American Economic Review, 97 (2): 137–141. DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.2.137

JEL Classification

  • C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
  • D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design