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  3. American Economic Review
  4. September 2007
  5. Selection Bias, Demographic Effects, and Ability Effects in Common Value Auction Experiments

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

Selection Bias, Demographic Effects, and Ability Effects in Common Value Auction Experiments

  • Marco Casari
  • John C. Ham
  • John H. Kagel
American Economic Review
vol. 97, no. 4, September 2007
(pp. 1278–1304)
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Abstract

Inexperienced women, along with economics and business majors, are much more susceptible to the winner's curse, as are subjects with lower SAT/ACT scores. There are strong selection effects in bid function estimates for inexperienced and experienced subjects due to bankruptcies and bidders who have lower earnings returning less frequently as experienced subjects. These selection effects are not identified using standard econometric techniques but are identified through experimental treatment effects. Ignoring these selection effects leads to misleading estimates of learning. (JEL D44, D83, J16)

Citation

Casari, Marco, John C. Ham, and John H. Kagel. 2007. "Selection Bias, Demographic Effects, and Ability Effects in Common Value Auction Experiments." American Economic Review, 97 (4): 1278–1304. DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.4.1278

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D44 Auctions
  • D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
  • J16 Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination