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  3. American Economic Review
  4. March 2008
  5. Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions

  • Daron Acemoglu
  • James A. Robinson
American Economic Review
vol. 98, no. 1, March 2008
(pp. 267–93)
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Abstract

We construct a model to study the implications of changes in political institutions for economic institutions. A change in political institutions alters the distribution of de jure political power, but creates incentives for investments in de facto political power to partially or even fully offset change in de jure power. The model can imply a pattern of captured democracy, whereby a democratic regime may survive but choose economic institutions favoring an elite. The model provides conditions under which economic or policy outcomes will be invariant to changes in political institutions, and economic institutions themselves will persist over time. (JEL D02, D72)

Citation

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2008. "Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions." American Economic Review, 98 (1): 267–93. DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.1.267

JEL Classification

  • D02 Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
  • D72 Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior