This website uses cookies.

By clicking the "Accept" button or continuing to browse our site, you agree to first-party and session-only cookies being stored on your device to enhance site navigation and analyze site performance and traffic. For more information on our use of cookies, please see our Privacy Policy.

  1. Home
  2. Journals
  3. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
  4. February 2015
  5. The Core Matchings of Markets with Transfers

American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics

ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)

The Core Matchings of Markets with Transfers

  • Christopher P. Chambers
  • Federico Echenique
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 7, no. 1, February 2015
(pp. 144–64)
Download Full Text PDF

Abstract

We characterize the structure of the set of core matchings of an assignment game (a two-sided market with transfers). Such a set satisfies a property we call consistency. Consistency of a set of matchings states that, for any matching v, if, for each agent i there exists a matching μ in the set for which μ(i) = v(i), then v is in the set. A set of matchings satisfies consistency if and only if there is an assignment game for which all elements of the set maximize the surplus. (JEL C78)

Citation

Chambers, Christopher P., and Federico Echenique. 2015. "The Core Matchings of Markets with Transfers." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7 (1): 144–64. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20130089

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
There are no comments for this article.
Login to Comment