American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Forthcoming Articles
Articles accepted for publication in forthcoming issues of the AEJ: Microeconomics. Preview links indicate that draft versions of full-text articles are available for AEA members only. Data sets and appendices are available for both members and non-members.
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Hybrid All-Pay and Winner-Pay Contests
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A Theory of One-Size-Fits-All Recommendations
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Screening Dominance: A Comparison of Noisy Signals
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Sequential Screening with Type-Enhancing Investment
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Reporting Sexual Misconduct in the #MeToo Era
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Information Spillover in Multi-good Adverse Selection
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Robust Minimal Instability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism
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On the Foundations of Ex Post Incentive Compatible Mechanisms
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Accountability and Grand Corruption
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Transition Dynamics in Equilibrium Search
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At the Helm, Kirk or Spock? The Pros and Cons of Charismatic Leadership
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Too Much Data: Prices and Inefficiencies in Data Markets
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Communication and Cooperation in Markets
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Rational Inattention in the Infield
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The Effect of Sequentiality on Cooperation in Repeated Games
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Voting Agendas and Preferences on Trees: Theory and Practice
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Disclosure and Favoritism in Sequential Elimination Contests
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Reaping the Informational Surplus in Bayesian Persuasion
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Crime, Broken Families, and Punishment
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Crime Chains
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Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue: Evidence from the Chinese Experiment
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Making Elections Work: Accountability with Selection and Control
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Coordination and Organization Design: Theory and Micro-Evidence
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Games Played by Teams of Players
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License Complementarity and Package Bidding: U.S. Spectrum Auctions
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Deposit Requirements in Auctions
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Expectations-Based Loss Aversion May Help Explain Seemingly Dominated Choices in Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
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What Should a Firm Know? Protecting Consumers' Privacy Rents
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Relative Wealth Concerns, Executive Compensation, and Managerial Risk-Taking
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Moral Hazard and Efficiency in a Frictional Market
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The Good, the Bad and the Complex: Product Design with Imperfect Information
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Sequential Learning
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Working for References
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The Effects of Time Preferences on Cooperation: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games
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An Information Theory of Efficient Differential Treatment
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Self-Reported Signaling
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Reference Dependence and Attribution Bias: Evidence from Real-Effort Experiments
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Competition in Pricing Algorithms
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Equilibrium Screening and Categorical Inequality
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Ten Isn't Large! Group Size and Coordination in a Large-Scale Experiment
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A Theory of Stability in Matching with Incomplete Information
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Too Good To Be True? Retention Rules for Noisy Agents
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Dynamic Privacy Choices
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Optimal Non-linear Pricing with Data-Sensitive Consumers
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Compatibility Choices, Switching Costs, and Data Portability
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Misbehavior in Common-Value Auctions: Bidding Rings and Shills
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Togetherness in the Household
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Blind Disclosure
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Product Quality and Consumer Search
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Influence Campaigns
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A Buyer Power Theory of Exclusive Dealing and Exclusionary Bundling
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Two-Stage Contests with Private Information
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The Dynamics of Property Rights in Modern Autocracies
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Raising the Bar: Certification Thresholds and Market Outcomes
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Judicial Mechanism Design
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Similarity Nash Equilibria in Statistical Games
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Dynamic Information Design under Constrained Communication Rules
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Bargaining over Treatment Choice under Disagreement
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Reference Pricing as a Deterrent to Entry: Evidence from the European Pharmaceutical Market
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Primary-Market Auctions for Event Tickets: Eliminating the Rents of “Bob the Broker”?
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Price Transparency, Media, and Informative Advertising
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Keeping up with "The Joneses": Reference Dependent Choice with Social Comparisons
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Disclosure in Markets for Ratings
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Debunking Rumors in Networks
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Alert the Inert? Switching Costs and Limited Awareness in Retail Electricity Markets
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Bounds on a Slope from Size Restrictions on Economic Shocks
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Implications of Unequal Discounting in Dynamic Contracting
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Learning by Choosing: Career Concerns with Observable Actions
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Decreasing Impatience
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Optimal Task Scheduling under Adverse Selection and Hidden Actions
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Competition for Attention and News Quality
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Markets with Within-Type Adverse Selection