American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Forthcoming Articles
Articles accepted for publication in forthcoming issues of the AEJ: Microeconomics. Preview links indicate that draft versions of full-text articles are available for AEA members only. Data sets and appendices are available for both members and non-members.
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Hybrid All-Pay and Winner-Pay Contests
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Information Spillover in Multi-good Adverse Selection
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At the Helm, Kirk or Spock? The Pros and Cons of Charismatic Leadership
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Relative Wealth Concerns, Executive Compensation, and Managerial Risk-Taking
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The Good, the Bad and the Complex: Product Design with Imperfect Information
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Working for References
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Self-Reported Signaling
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Reference Dependence and Attribution Bias: Evidence from Real-Effort Experiments
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Competition in Pricing Algorithms
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Equilibrium Screening and Categorical Inequality
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Targeted Product Design
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Too Good To Be True? Retention Rules for Noisy Agents
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Influence Campaigns
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A Buyer Power Theory of Exclusive Dealing and Exclusionary Bundling
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The Dynamics of Property Rights in Modern Autocracies
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Raising the Bar: Certification Thresholds and Market Outcomes
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Judicial Mechanism Design
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Similarity Nash Equilibria in Statistical Games
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Bargaining over Treatment Choice under Disagreement
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Reference Pricing as a Deterrent to Entry: Evidence from the European Pharmaceutical Market
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Biased Beliefs in Search Markets
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Bid Caps in Noisy Contests
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Keeping up with "The Joneses": Reference Dependent Choice with Social Comparisons
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Disclosure in Markets for Ratings
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Bounds on a Slope from Size Restrictions on Economic Shocks
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Learning by Choosing: Career Concerns with Observable Actions
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Decreasing Impatience
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Optimal Task Scheduling under Adverse Selection and Hidden Actions
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Competition for Attention and News Quality
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Markets with Within-Type Adverse Selection
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Monitor Reputation and Transparency
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Ad Clutter, Time Use, and Media Diversity
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Complexity and Procedural Choice
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The Doors of Perception: Theory and Evidence of Frame-Dependent Rationalizability
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Multihoming and Oligopolistic Platform Competition
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Stable and Efficient Resource Allocation with Contracts