AEA Papers and Proceedings
ISSN 2574-0768 (Print) | ISSN 2574-0776 (Online)
Artificial Intelligence, Algorithm Design, and Pricing
AEA Papers and Proceedings
vol. 112,
May 2022
(pp. 452–56)
Abstract
We calculate the time path of prices generated by algorithmic pricing games that differ in their learning protocols. Asynchronous learning occurs when the algorithm only learns about the return from the action it actually took. Synchronous learning occurs when the artificial intelligence conducts counterfactuals to learn about the returns it would have earned had it taken an alternative action. In a simple market setting, we show that synchronous updating can lead to competitive pricing, while asynchronous updating can lead to pricing close to monopoly levels. However, building simple economic reasoning into the asynchronous algorithms significantly modifies the prices it generates.Citation
Asker, John, Chaim Fershtman, and Ariel Pakes. 2022. "Artificial Intelligence, Algorithm Design, and Pricing." AEA Papers and Proceedings, 112: 452–56. DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20221059Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C70 Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
- D40 Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness