American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy
ISSN 1945-7731 (Print) | ISSN 1945-774X (Online)
A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
vol. 1,
no. 1, February 2009
(pp. 28–51)
Abstract
This paper offers a new theoretical approach to urban squatting, reflecting the view that squatters and formal residents compete for land within a city. The key implication is that squatters "squeeze" the formal market, raising the price paid by formal residents. The squatter organizer ensures that squeezing is not too severe, since otherwise, the formal price will rise to a level that invites eviction by landowners. Because eviction is absent in equilibrium, the model differs from previous analytical frameworks, where eviction occurs with some probability. It also facilitates a general equilibrium analysis of squatter formalization policies. (JEL O15, Q15, R14)Citation
Brueckner, Jan K., and Harris Selod. 2009. "A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 1 (1): 28–51. DOI: 10.1257/pol.1.1.28JEL Classification
- O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
- Q15 Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation
- R14 Land Use Patterns
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