American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy
ISSN 1945-7731 (Print) | ISSN 1945-774X (Online)
Tenure in Office and Public Procurement
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
vol. 9,
no. 3, August 2017
(pp. 59–105)
Abstract
We study the impact of politicians' tenure in office on the outcomes of public procurement using a dataset on Italian municipal governments. To identify a causal relation, we first compare elections where the incumbent mayor barely won or barely lost another term. We then use the introduction of a two-term limit, which granted one potential extra term to mayors appointed before the reform. The main result is that an increase in tenure is associated with "worse" procurement outcomes. Our estimates are informative of the possibility that time in office progressively leads to collusion between government officials and local bidders.Citation
Coviello, Decio, and Stefano Gagliarducci. 2017. "Tenure in Office and Public Procurement." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 9 (3): 59–105. DOI: 10.1257/pol.20150426Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H57 National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement
- H76 State and Local Government: Other Expenditure Categories
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