American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy
ISSN 1945-7731 (Print) | ISSN 1945-774X (Online)
Government Transfers and Votes for State Intervention
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
vol. 16,
no. 3, August 2024
(pp. 451–80)
Abstract
Government transfers might have long-lasting consequences on electoral outcomes. We study a regional policy implemented in Italy over the second half of the twentieth century and leverage variation in transfers to show that parties promoting more state intervention in the economy performed better in the targeted areas relative to places that were not subsidized, decades after the end of the policy. This effect does not seem to mirror long-term differences in the economic performance of treated and control areas, which were small, nor other attitudes within the electorate.Citation
Albanese, Giuseppe, Guido de Blasio, and Lorenzo Incoronato. 2024. "Government Transfers and Votes for State Intervention." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 16 (3): 451–80. DOI: 10.1257/pol.20220452Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H76 State and Local Government: Other Expenditure Categories
- I38 Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
- N34 Economic History: Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy: Europe: 1913-
- N44 Economic History: Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation: Europe: 1913-
- R53 Public Facility Location Analysis; Public Investment and Capital Stock
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