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  3. American Economic Review
  4. May 2017
  5. Large-Scale Affirmative Action in School Choice: Admissions to IITs in India

Large-Scale Affirmative Action in School Choice: Admissions to IITs in India

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Abstract

We provide a real-life application of a large scale affirmative action policy in school choice in the context of engineering school admissions in India where students not only care about what program they are matched to but also what type of seat category they are admitted under. We explain the market and the mechanism currently in use. Two significant shortcomings of the current mechanism are explained. The affirmative action policy in use leaves many seats vacant even though there are students who would take these seats. We provide the insight of a potential matching-theoretical solution to these problems.

Citation

Aygün, Orhan, and Bertan Turhan. 2017. "Large-Scale Affirmative Action in School Choice: Admissions to IITs in India." American Economic Review, 107 (5): 210-13. DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20171049

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
  • H52 National Government Expenditures and Education
  • I21 Analysis of Education
  • I28 Education: Government Policy
  • O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration