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  4. May 2017
  5. Assortative Matching under Asymmetric Information: Evidence from Malawi

Assortative Matching under Asymmetric Information: Evidence from Malawi

  • Manuela Angelucci
  • Daniel Bennett
American Economic Review
vol. 107, no. 5, May 2017
(pp. 154-57)
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Abstract

Asymmetric information is a key feature of the marriage market. In HIV-endemic settings, HIV risk is an important partner attribute that may influence marriage timing and partner selection. We use a sample of married women in rural Malawi to validate a model of positive assortative matching under asymmetric information. Several correlations support this framework, suggesting that HIV risk contributes to adverse selection in the marriage market in this setting.

Citation

Angelucci, Manuela, and Daniel Bennett. 2017. "Assortative Matching under Asymmetric Information: Evidence from Malawi." American Economic Review, 107 (5): 154-57. DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20171055

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
  • D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
  • I12 Health Behavior
  • J12 Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse
  • J16 Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
  • O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration