Quantifying the Disincentive Effects of Joint Taxation on Married Women's Labor Supply
- (pp. 100-104)
(Complimentary)
Abstract
We quantify the disincentive effects of elements of joint taxation in the labor income tax codes of 17 European countries and the US. We analyze the extent to which hours worked of married men and women would change if each country switched to a system of separate taxation of married couples. In this hypothetical tax reform, we keep the average tax burden of married households constant. With the exception of four countries featuring already a system of separate taxation, the model predicts that married women's hours worked increase on average by 115 hours, or 10.5 percent, through this reform.Citation
Bick, Alexander, and Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln. 2017. "Quantifying the Disincentive Effects of Joint Taxation on Married Women's Labor Supply." American Economic Review, 107 (5): 100-104. DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20171063Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- H24 Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes
- H31 Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Household
- J12 Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse
- J16 Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
- J22 Time Allocation and Labor Supply
- K34 Tax Law