Civil Service Exams and Organizational Performance: Evidence from the Pendleton Act

Moreira, Diana; Pérez, Santiago

doi:10.1257/app.20220284

Abstract

We use newly digitized data to study the impacts of a historical reform that mandated exams for some employees in the largest U.S. customs-collection districts. Although the reform improved targeted employees’ professional backgrounds and reduced turnover, it did not lead to significant improvements in the cost-effectiveness of customs revenue collection. The incomplete reach of the reform was key for this partial success: First, the reform incentivized hiring in exam-exempted positions, distorting districts’ hierarchical structure. Second, since we find suggestive evidence that districts’ top managers mattered for performance, not changing their appointment method might have constituted a missed opportunity for improvement.

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Civil Service Exams and Organizational Performance: Evidence from the Pendleton Act

Abstract

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