Childcare Subsidies and Child Skill Accumulation in One- and Two-Parent Families
- (pp. 475-516)
Abstract
I examine the role of family structure and childcare subsidies in child skill accumulation. I establish empirically that skill accumulation is more responsive to childcare price for one-parent families than for two-parent families. I analyze the effects of childcare subsidies in a model featuring endogenous family formation, parental altruism, and a baseline subsidy resembling that of the United States. I find that eliminating this subsidy generates welfare losses of 1.63 percent of lifetime consumption, that equilibrium adjustments act to mitigate these losses, and that increasing uptake among one-parent families yields the highest welfare gains per additional recipient.Citation
Moschini, Emily G. 2023. "Childcare Subsidies and Child Skill Accumulation in One- and Two-Parent Families." American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 15 (1): 475-516. DOI: 10.1257/mac.20200282Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- I21 Analysis of Education
- I26 Returns to Education
- J12 Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse
- J13 Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
- J24 Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
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