In finitely repeated prisoner dilemma games, two-person teams start
with significantly less cooperation than individuals, consistent with
results from the psychology literature. This quickly gives way to teams
cooperating more than individuals. Team dialogues show increased
payoffs from cooperation, along with anticipating opponents’
recognition of the same, provides the basis for cooperation, even
while fully anticipating defection near the end game. A strong
status quo bias in defecting across super-games limits unraveling.
Defecting typically occurs one round earlier across super-games,
consistent with low marginal, or even negative, benefits of more than
one-step-ahead defection. (JEL C72, C73, C90, D12)
Kagel, John H., and Peter McGee.
"Team versus Individual Play in Finitely Repeated Prisoner Dilemma Games."
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Design of Experiments: General
Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis