Affirmative Action: One Size Does Not Fit All
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 8,
no. 2, May 2016
(pp. 215-52)
Abstract
This paper identifies a new reason for giving preferences to the disadvantaged using a model of contests. There are two forces at work: the effort effect working against giving preferences and the selection effect working in favor of them. When education is costly and easy to obtain (as in the United States), the selection effect dominates. When education is heavily subsidized and limited in supply (as in India), preferences are welfare reducing. The model also shows that unequal treatment of identical agents can be welfare improving, providing insights into when the counterintuitive policy of rationing educational access to some subgroups is welfare improving. (JEL H52, H75, I23, I28, J15, O15)Citation
Krishna, Kala, and Alexander Tarasov. 2016. "Affirmative Action: One Size Does Not Fit All." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8 (2): 215-52. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140200Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- H52 National Government Expenditures and Education
- H75 State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
- I23 Higher Education; Research Institutions
- I28 Education: Government Policy
- J15 Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
- O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
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