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This paper develops a theory of partisanship as a self-fulfilling
prophecy. In a dynamic model where officeholders know more
than voters about the best policy, partisanship emerges although
voters and officeholders have identical, non-partisan policy prefer-
ences. We show that if voters associate politicians' identities (e.g.,
party affiliations) with future policy choices, officeholders are in-
centivized to act according to their perceived identities. Identities
thus act like `sunspots': they drive policy only because voters think
they do. The equilibrium features policy persistence, incumbency
advantage, and political failure. If voters do not expect identities
to matter, in contrast, the equilibrium is non-partisan.