American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Costly Persuasion
American Economic Review
vol. 104,
no. 5, May 2014
(pp. 457–62)
Abstract
We study the design of informational environments in settings where generating information is costly. We assume that the cost of a signal is proportional to the expected reduction in uncertainty. We show that Kamenica & Gentzkow's (2011) concavification approach to characterizing optimal signals extends to these settings.Citation
Gentzkow, Matthew, and Emir Kamenica. 2014. "Costly Persuasion." American Economic Review, 104 (5): 457–62. DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.5.457Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief