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  3. American Economic Review
  4. December 2007
  5. Individual Preferences for Giving

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

Individual Preferences for Giving

  • Raymond Fisman
  • Shachar Kariv
  • Daniel Markovits
American Economic Review
vol. 97, no. 5, December 2007
(pp. 1858–1876)
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Abstract

We utilize graphical representations of Dictator Games which generate rich individual- level data. Our baseline experiment employs budget sets over feasible payoff- pairs. We test these data for consistency with utility maximization, and we recover the underlying preferences for giving (trade-offs between own payoffs and the payoffs of others). Two further experiments augment the analysis. An extensive elaboration employs three-person budget sets to distinguish preferences for giving from social preferences (trade-offs between the payoffs of others). And an intensive elaboration employs step-shaped sets to distinguish between behaviors that are compatible with well-behaved preferences and those compatible only with not well-behaved cases. (JEL C72, D64)

Citation

Fisman, Raymond, Shachar Kariv, and Daniel Markovits. 2007. "Individual Preferences for Giving." American Economic Review, 97 (5): 1858–1876. DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.5.1858

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C72 Noncooperative Games
  • D64 Altruism; Philanthropy