American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Endogenous Appropriability
American Economic Review
vol. 107,
no. 5, May 2017
(pp. 317–21)
Abstract
Most approaches to entrepreneurship assume that entrepreneurial control over their inventions is critical for success and, in turn, for incentives. Such control is usually supported by regulations that protect intellectual property including patents, copyrights, and trade secrets. Each give the entrepreneurs control over who can appropriate value from their activities. However, we note that another, distinct path exists for appropriation by entrepreneurs' execution. Execution forgoes the formal protection from control instead of a more rapid approach to market in the pursuit of capabilities that will allow entrepreneurs to compete with others in the future rather than block their activities per se. We characterize the conditions under which one path is preferred to another and present evidence from university startups delineating the tradeoffs at the heart of our theoretical approach.Citation
Gans, Joshua S., and Scott Stern. 2017. "Endogenous Appropriability." American Economic Review, 107 (5): 317–21. DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20171011Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D22 Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
- L26 Entrepreneurship
- M13 New Firms; Startups
- O31 Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives