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  3. American Economic Review
  4. May 2017
  5. Specifying a Structural Matching Game of Trading Networks with Transferable Utility

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

Specifying a Structural Matching Game of Trading Networks with Transferable Utility

  • Jeremy T. Fox
American Economic Review
vol. 107, no. 5, May 2017
(pp. 256–60)
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Abstract

Structural estimation of matching games with transferable utility, including matching games of trading networks and many-to-many matching, is increasingly popular in empirical work. I explore several modeling decisions that need to be made when specifying a structural model for a matching game. One decision is the choice of a game theoretic solution concept to impose in the structural model. I discuss pairwise stability, competitive equilibrium, and noncooperative games such as auctions. Another decision is whether to work with a continuum of agents or a finite number of agents. I explore other issues as well.

Citation

Fox, Jeremy T. 2017. "Specifying a Structural Matching Game of Trading Networks with Transferable Utility." American Economic Review, 107 (5): 256–60. DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20171114

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
  • D40 Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General
  • D85 Network Formation and Analysis: Theory