American Economic Journal:
Applied Economics
ISSN 1945-7782 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7790 (Online)
When Individual Politics Become Public: Do Civil Service Protections Insulate Government Workers?
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
vol. 16,
no. 3, July 2024
(pp. 292–322)
Abstract
This paper examines whether the civil service system protected state bureaucrats from political interference following a recall petition against the governor of Wisconsin. I find that most classified workers, who were covered by the state civil service laws, were paid equally by signing status following the public disclosure of the petition list. Conversely, signers in the unclassified service, a smaller set of government positions, were paid about 3 percent less annually relative to nonsigners in the postdisclosure period. These results indicate that the civil service insulated qualified bureaucrats, while uncovered workers faced retribution.Citation
Foy, Morgan. 2024. "When Individual Politics Become Public: Do Civil Service Protections Insulate Government Workers?" American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 16 (3): 292–322. DOI: 10.1257/app.20220723Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D73 Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H75 State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
- H83 Public Administration; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
- J31 Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- J45 Public Sector Labor Markets
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