Journal of Economic Perspectives
ISSN 0895-3309 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7965 (Online)
Anticompetitive Contracts between Insurers and Providers in Health Care
Journal of Economic Perspectives
(pp. 69–92)
(Complimentary)
Abstract
For people with private health insurance in the United States, contracts between insurers and providers are important to fostering health care competition and improving efficiency. However, insurer-provider contract provisions do not always advance competition and consumer welfare. This essay discusses the contracting strategies used by insurers to increase competition, and four anticompetitive contract terms: anti-tiering or anti-steering, all-or-nothing, most favored nation, and gag clauses, that may be used by dominant health systems to protect themselves from competition. I conclude with a discussion of policy responses that can be used to address provider use of anticompetitive clauses and that can reduce the negative impacts of provider market power. Understanding anticompetitive contract provisions and the potential policy responses to limit their impact is critical to health care competition.Citation
Sinaiko, Anna D. 2026. "Anticompetitive Contracts between Insurers and Providers in Health Care." Journal of Economic Perspectives 40 (2): 69–92. DOI: 10.1257/jep.20251471Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- G22 Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- I11 Analysis of Health Care Markets
- I13 Health Insurance, Public and Private
- I18 Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- I38 Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
- L13 Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L14 Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks