American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Strategic Vote Trading in Power Sharing Systems
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 9,
no. 2, May 2017
(pp. 76–94)
Abstract
This paper studies decentralized vote trading in a power sharing system that follows the rules of strategic market games. In particular, we study a two-party election in which prior to the voting stage, voters are free to trade votes for money. Voters hold private information about both their ordinal and cardinal preferences, whereas their utilities are proportionally increasing in the vote share of their favorite party. In this framework, we prove generic existence of a unique full trade equilibrium (an equilibrium in which nobody refrains from vote trading). Moreover, we argue that vote trading in such systems unambiguously improves voters' welfare.Citation
Xefteris, Dimitrios, and Nicholas Ziros. 2017. "Strategic Vote Trading in Power Sharing Systems." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 9 (2): 76–94. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150254Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C72 Noncooperative Games
- D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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