American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Two-Sided Matching with (Almost) One-Sided Preferences
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 11,
no. 3, August 2019
(pp. 155–90)
Abstract
In a two-sided matching context we show how we can predict stable matchings by considering only one side's preferences and the mutually acceptable pairs of agents. Our methodology consists of identifying impossible matches, i.e., pairs of agents that can never be matched together in a stable matching of any problem consistent with the partial data. We analyze data from the French academic job market for mathematicians and show that the match of about 45 percent of positions (and about 60 percent of candidates) does not depend on the preferences of the hired candidates, unobserved and submitted at the final stage of the market.Citation
Haeringer, Guillaume, and Vincent Iehlé. 2019. "Two-Sided Matching with (Almost) One-Sided Preferences." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 11 (3): 155–90. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170115Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- I23 Higher Education; Research Institutions
- J41 Labor Contracts
- J44 Professional Labor Markets; Occupational Licensing
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