This website uses cookies.

By clicking the "Accept" button or continuing to browse our site, you agree to first-party and session-only cookies being stored on your device to enhance site navigation and analyze site performance and traffic. For more information on our use of cookies, please see our Privacy Policy.

  1. Home
  2. Journals
  3. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
  4. November 2021
  5. A Delegation-Based Theory of Expertise

American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics

ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)

A Delegation-Based Theory of Expertise

  • Attila Ambrus
  • Volodymyr Baranovskyi
  • Aaron Kolb
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 13, no. 4, November 2021
(pp. 373–419)
Download Full Text PDF

Abstract

We investigate information aggregation and competition in a delegation framework. An uninformed principal is unable to perform a task herself and must choose between one of two biased and imperfectly informed experts. In the focal equilibrium, experts exaggerate their biases, anticipating an ideological winner's curse. We show that having a second expert can benefit the principal, even when equally or more biased than the first expert. The principal can benefit from commitment to an "element of surprise" and prefers experts with equal rather than opposite biases.

Citation

Ambrus, Attila, Volodymyr Baranovskyi, and Aaron Kolb. 2021. "A Delegation-Based Theory of Expertise." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 13 (4): 373–419. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190008

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
  • D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
There are no comments for this article.
Login to Comment