American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Recurring Auctions with Costly Entry: Theory and Evidence
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
(pp. 36–71)
Abstract
Recurring auctions are widely used to sell durable assets, with follow-up auctions held for unsold items. We investigate such auctions theoretically and empirically. Theoretical analysis demonstrates that recurring auctions outperform single-round auctions when buyers face entry costs, enhancing efficiency and revenue due to sorted entry of potential buyers. Optimal reserve price sequences are characterized. Empirical findings from home foreclosure auctions in China reveal significant annual gains in efficiency (US$3.40 billion, 16.60 percent) and revenue (US$2.97 billion, 15.92 percent) using recurring auctions compared with single-round auctions. Implementing optimal reserve prices can further improve efficiency (3.35 percent) and revenue (3.06 percent).Citation
Deng, Shanglyu, and Qiyao Zhou. 2026. "Recurring Auctions with Costly Entry: Theory and Evidence." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 18 (4): 36–71. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20230303Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D44 Auctions
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- R31 Housing Supply and Markets