American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Learning in the Marriage Market: The Economics of Dating
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
(pp. 457–98)
Abstract
This paper develops a search-and-matching model where potential partners can learn about their compatibility as a couple by spending time together (interpreted as dating). We show that a steady-state equilibrium exists and characterize its induced dating patterns. In equilibrium, highly attractive individuals are more selective. We derive conditions under which equilibria induce positive assortative matching and show that even when these conditions hold, the socially optimal outcome can exhibit negative assortative matching. Finally, the framework is applied to study the effect of recent advances in search technologies on dating patterns and the connection between dating and interracial segregation.Citation
Antler, Yair, Daniel Bird, and Daniel Fershtman. 2026. "Learning in the Marriage Market: The Economics of Dating." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 18 (4): 457–98. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20240014Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- J12 Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse