American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Electoral Campaign Attacks: Theory and Evidence
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
(pp. 208–48)
Abstract
This paper studies the determinants of electoral campaign attacks. We first propose a model to examine the main factors that influence candidates' decisions to attack. Our theoretical analysis yields a number of predictions that we test using information from "right of reply" lawsuits filed in Brazil. Our empirical analysis exploits a regression discontinuity design based on virtual ties between second- and third-place candidates to show that candidates with an electoral advantage are more likely to receive an attack. We then exploit another discontinuity to show that the patterns of campaign attacks differ significantly under single- and dual-ballot plurality systems.Citation
Nakaguma, Marcos Y., and Danilo Souza. 2026. "Electoral Campaign Attacks: Theory and Evidence." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 18 (4): 208–48. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20240211Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D74 Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- K16 Election Law