American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
The Economics of Discriminatory Job Reservations
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
(pp. 361–91)
Abstract
A society reserves certain jobs for members of a politically dominant social group to maximize the wages of workers in that group. Through an appropriate choice of reserved jobs, the dominant group chooses both the size of the set of reserved jobs and the elasticity of substitution between reserved and unreserved jobs. Optimal discrimination endogenously creates categories of "good" and "bad" jobs and assigns workers from different social groups into these different categories. The relative scarcity of labor determines whether discrimination or free labor markets are optimal. I apply the model to apartheid South Africa and other discriminatory societies.Citation
Choy, James P. 2026. "The Economics of Discriminatory Job Reservations." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 18 (3): 361–91. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20250072Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- H22 Taxation and Subsidies: Incidence
- J15 Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
- J22 Time Allocation and Labor Supply
- J31 Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- J42 Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets
- J71 Labor Discrimination
- N37 Economic History: Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy: Africa; Oceania