American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Data Linkages and Privacy Regulation
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
(pp. 317–60)
Abstract
We assess the efficacy of privacy regulation when consumers are privacy conscious. We develop a model of data linkages where a consumer interacts sequentially with two firms: One firm collects data on consumer behavior, and the other firm leverages the data to set a quality level and a price. A data linkage benefits the consumer in equilibrium when the recipient firm is sufficiently similar to the collecting firm. We endogenize linkage formation under several existing privacy regulations. Voluntary consent requirements benefit consumers in equilibrium, but blanket bans on discriminatory price and quality offers harm them.Citation
Argenziano, Rossella, and Alessandro Bonatti. 2026. "Data Linkages and Privacy Regulation." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 18 (3): 317–60. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20250190Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D11 Consumer Economics: Theory
- D21 Firm Behavior: Theory
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness