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  3. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
  4. February 2012
  5. Fraternities and Labor-Market Outcomes

American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics

ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)

Fraternities and Labor-Market Outcomes

  • Sergey V. Popov
  • Dan Bernhardt
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 4, no. 1, February 2012
(pp. 116–41)
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Abstract

We model how student choices to rush a fraternity, and fraternity admission choices, interact with signals firms receive about student productivities to determine labor-market outcomes. The fraternity and students value wages and fraternity socializing values. We provide sufficient conditions under which, in equilibrium, most members have intermediate abilities: weak students apply, but are rejected unless they have high socializing values, while most able students do not apply to avoid taint from association with weaker members. (JEL C72, J24, J31, Z13)

Citation

Popov, Sergey V., and Dan Bernhardt. 2012. "Fraternities and Labor-Market Outcomes." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 4 (1): 116–41. DOI: 10.1257/mic.4.1.116

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C72 Noncooperative Games
  • J24 Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
  • J31 Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
  • Z13 Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
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