American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Competitive Nonlinear Taxation and Constitutional Choice
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 4,
no. 1, February 2012
(pp. 142–75)
Abstract
In an economy where agents have different productivities and mobility, we compare a unified nonlinear optimal taxation with the equilibrium taxation that would be chosen by two competing tax authorities if the same economy were divided into two states. The overall level of progressivity and redistribution is unambiguously lower under competitive taxation; the "rich" are always in favor of competing authorities, whereas the "poor" are always in favor of unified taxation; the preferences of the middle class depend on the initial conditions in terms of the distribution of abilities, the relative power of the various classes, and mobility costs. (JEL D72, H21, H23, H24)Citation
Morelli, Massimo, Huanxing Yang, and Lixin Ye. 2012. "Competitive Nonlinear Taxation and Constitutional Choice." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 4 (1): 142–75. DOI: 10.1257/mic.4.1.142Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H21 Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H23 Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- H24 Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes
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