American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Truth in Consequentiality: Theory and Field Evidence on Discrete Choice Experiments
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 4,
no. 4, November 2012
(pp. 145–71)
Abstract
This paper explores methodological issues surrounding the use of discrete choice experiments to elicit values for public goods. We develop an explicit game theoretic model of individual decisions, providing conditions under which surveys with a single binary choice question, or sequence of binary choice questions, are incentive-compatible. We complement the theory with a framed field experiment, with treatments that span the spectrum from incentive-compatible, financially binding decisions to decisions with no direct financial consequences. The results suggest truthful preference revelation is possible, provided that participants view their decisions as having more than a weak chance of influencing policy. (JEL C83, C93, H41, Q23)Citation
Vossler, Christian A., Maurice Doyon, and Daniel Rondeau. 2012. "Truth in Consequentiality: Theory and Field Evidence on Discrete Choice Experiments." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 4 (4): 145–71. DOI: 10.1257/mic.4.4.145Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C83 Survey Methods; Sampling Methods
- C93 Field Experiments
- H41 Public Goods
- Q23 Renewable Resources and Conservation: Forestry
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