This website uses cookies.

By clicking the "Accept" button or continuing to browse our site, you agree to first-party and session-only cookies being stored on your device to enhance site navigation and analyze site performance and traffic. For more information on our use of cookies, please see our Privacy Policy.

  1. Home
  2. Journals
  3. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
  4. November 2014
  5. Strategic Private Experimentation

American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics

ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)

Strategic Private Experimentation

  • Mike Felgenhauer
  • Elisabeth Schulte
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 6, no. 4, November 2014
(pp. 74–105)
Download Full Text PDF

Abstract

We consider a model of persuasion in which an agent who tries to persuade a decision maker can sequentially acquire imperfect signals. The agent's information acquisition is unobservable and he has the option to hide unfavorable signals. Nevertheless, if the signal precision is sufficiently high, he can persuade the decision maker by revealing a sufficiently large number of favorable signals. When the number of signals that can be transmitted to the decision maker is limited, persuasion is impossible if the agent's stakes are too high.

Citation

Felgenhauer, Mike, and Elisabeth Schulte. 2014. "Strategic Private Experimentation." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6 (4): 74–105. DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.4.74

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
  • D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
There are no comments for this article.
Login to Comment