Fees, Reputation, and Information Production in the Credit Rating Industry
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 13,
no. 2, May 2021
(pp. 1-34)
Abstract
We compare a credit rating agency's incentives to acquire costly information when it is only paid for giving favorable ratings to the corresponding incentives when the agency is paid up-front, i.e., irrespective of the ratings assigned. We show that, in the presence of moral hazard, contingent fees provide stronger dynamic incentives to acquire information than up-front fees and may induce higher social welfare. When the fee structure is chosen by the agency, contingent fees arise as an equilibrium outcome, in line with the way the market for credit rating actually works.Citation
Bizzotto, Jacopo, and Adrien Vigier. 2021. "Fees, Reputation, and Information Production in the Credit Rating Industry." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 13 (2): 1-34. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180170Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D21 Firm Behavior: Theory
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- G24 Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
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