Liability Insurance: Equilibrium Contracts under Monopoly and Competition Jorge Lemus, Emil Temnyalov and John L. Turner (pp. 83-115)
Sequential Preference Revelation in Incomplete Information Settings James Schummer and Rodrigo A. Velez (pp. 116-47)
Dynamic Persuasion with Outside Information Jacopo Bizzotto, Jesper Rüdiger and Adrien Vigier (pp. 179-94)
A Leverage Theory of Tying in Two-Sided Markets with Nonnegative Price Constraints Jay Pil Choi and Doh-Shin Jeon (pp. 283-337)
Organizing Time Exchanges: Lessons from Matching Markets Tommy Andersson, Ágnes Cseh, Lars Ehlers and Albin Erlanson (pp. 338-73)