This website uses cookies.

By clicking the "Accept" button or continuing to browse our site, you agree to first-party and session-only cookies being stored on your device to enhance site navigation and analyze site performance and traffic. For more information on our use of cookies, please see our Privacy Policy.

  1. Home
  2. Journals
  3. American Economic Review: Insights
  4. Forthcoming Articles
  5. Exogenous Exits, Market Structure, and Equilibrium Contracts in Healthcare

American Economic Review: Insights

ISSN 2640-205X (Print) | ISSN 2640-2068 (Online)

Exogenous Exits, Market Structure, and Equilibrium Contracts in Healthcare

  • Natalia Serna
American Economic Review: Insights (Forthcoming)

Abstract

This paper quantifies the causal effects of exogenous health insurer exits on contract structure and healthcare market outcomes, proposing market concentration as a likely mechanism for these effects. Leveraging the termination of the largest health insurer in Colombia, I find that the use of fee-for-service contracts increased after the termination relative to capitation contracts. Treatment effects are larger in markets with higher provider than insurer concentration at baseline. Results suggest that equilibrium contracts place the financial risk on insurers in markets where providers have higher bargaining leverage.

Downloads