An Anatomy of Arbitrageurs: Evidence from Open-End Structured Funds
Abstract
This paper exploits a unique account-level dataset of structured funds to study how arbitrageurstrade during bubble periods (i.e., when large positive swings of mispricing occur in structured
funds). I find that arbitrageurs can both ride bubbles during the bubble-formation periods and
make arbitrage trades during the bubble-bursting periods. In particular, arbitrageurs ride bubbles
more aggressively when local unsophisticated investors start to trade in the direction of fueling
bubbles and quit this strategy when mispricing becomes excessive. Identification tests based on the
social contagion effect among unsophisticated investors support a causal interpretation. Moreover,
arbitrageurs who can ride bubbles make more trading profits than those who only conduct arbitrage
trades. These results suggest that arbitrageurs do not always trade in the direction of eliminating
mispricing and that local information may play a pivotal role in shaping their trading motivations.